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LOVING GOD AND ONE'S NEIGHBOR: 
THOMISTIC CHARITY 
Don Adams 
St. Thomas Aquinas defines charity (caritas) as a "friendship of a person for 
God" and he claims that charity "extends itself to sinners, whom we love 
from charity because of God (propter Deum)" (Summa Theologiae q. 23 a.l 
and ad 3). However, it is not clear what it means to love someone "because 
of God," nor is it clear how a friendship which is "for God" can "extend 
itself' to someone other than God. This paper clarifies what Aquinas means 
here by focusing on three questions. (1) Is charity for a sinner anything more 
than an insipid, kindly attitude? (2) If charity is by definition "for God," then 
can a human being count as a genuine cause of charity? (3) If with charity 
we love our fellow human beings only "because of God," then is charity a 
genuine form of friendship between human beings? 
Section 1: Introduction. 
A friend of mine once got into trouble when she was very young during her 
brief career at a parochial school. The teacher asked, "Who here loves Jesus 
with his whole, entire heart?" Every one in class raised his hand-except my 
friend. She innocently explained that she didn't love Jesus with her whole 
heart, because with a part of her heart she loved her mother. She was sent 
down to the priest who tried to explain to her that she should love her mother 
"through" Jesus, and that was how she could love Jesus and her mother. This 
made no sense to her, and soon she had her mother take her out of that school. 
I assume that my friend's intuition involved something like the following 
two claims. Claim 1: If you love someone with your whole heart, then you 
love that person to the exclusion of all others. Claim 2: You should not love 
one person to the exclusion of all others. Claim 2 seems correct. Loving only 
one person is dangerously obsessive and unhealthy. Claim 1 is reasonable as 
well. If your "whole heart" is devoted to one person, then there seems to be 
nothing left of your "heart" to devote to anyone else. So we can construct a 
dilemma. Either we accept (1) and reject (2), in which case it seems that 
Christians will appear to be dangerously obsessive and unhealthy; or we 
accept (2) and reject (1) in which case Christians cannot be "wholly" devoted 
to God. For Christians there is something unattractive in both alternatives, 
so it would be preferable to find a way "between the horns." 
Something very like this dilemma can be raised for Aquinas' theory of 
Christian charity (caritas). On the one hand. Aquinas defines charity as a 
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"friendship of a person for God."1 Taken out of context, this definition seems 
to entail that charity is a dangerously obsessive and unhealthy love, because 
it seems to rule out friendship for sinners by definition. The friendship of a 
person for a sinner seems not to be a "friendship of a person for God," and 
so seems ipso Jacto not to be an instance of charity. Hence charity seems to 
have God as its object to the exclusion of all other persons. 
But of course the context in which the definition is given seems to rule out 
this interpretation. Aquinas tells us in the same article that charity "extends 
itself to sinners, whom we love from charity for God's sake (propter Deum)."2 
Of course this allows charity to have many objects, hence we might worry 
that this multiplication of objects of love will undermine a total devotion to 
God. Aquinas answers this worry by adding that sinners are objects of charity 
only "for God's sake" or "because of God" (propter Deum). In some sense 
God is the "primary object" of charity while others are only "secondary 
objects" of charity. 
So Aquinas seems to have a clear way to avoid the dilemma I have posed. 
On the one hand, Christian charity is not dangerously obsessive because it 
has many objects besides God. On the other hand, this multiplication of 
objects does not compromise total devotion to God because even though there 
are many objects of charity, there is only one "primary object," and that object 
is God. This is right as far as it goes, but it doesn't go far enough. We still 
need to know precisely how a "primary object" of charity differs from a 
"secondary object" of charity. 
One straightforward way in which God could be the "primary object" of 
charity while fellow sinners are "secondary objects" is suggested by Aquinas' 
claim that "in love of a neighbor is included love of God as an end is included 
in the means."3 Perhaps the "primary/secondary" distinction should be un-
derstood as the "end/means" distinction. Perhaps with charity I am to love 
my neighbor "for God's sake" just as I love wine for the sake of, i.e. as a 
means to, pleasure. But the problem with this suggestion is that the wine 
example is used by Aquinas (following Aristotle) to point out a deficient kind 
of love.4 We don't love wine for its own sake, and so there is no true friend-
ship for wine. What we can have for wine is "concupiscence." So if Aquinas 
takes seriously the apparent suggestion of the quoted passage, he seems to 
be forced into the conclusion that with charity there is no true friendship for 
fellow sinners. God is the "primary object" of charity in the sense that God 
is the only genuine object of charity. Fellow sinners are "secondary objects" 
of charity in the sense that they are not genuine objects of charity, they are 
somehow merely means to the love of God, as the wine is merely a means to 
pleasure. On this view, charity does not involve a genuine friendship for God 
and one's neighbor; the genuine friendship is for God alone. 
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This strikes me as a problem. It seems to me that a uniquely Christian form 
of love should be capable of including a very intimate and genuine friendship 
with our fellow human beings. In this paper I want to argue that Aquinas' 
theory of charity does not make the complete devotion to God incompatible 
with a genuine friendship for our fellow human beings.s My argument comes 
in the following three parts. 
First, all friendship is based on some shared, common interest or "associa-
tion" (communicatio is the usual Latin translation of Aristotle's koinonia). 
The association which serves as the necessary basis of charity is the mere 
capacity to attain the same end, i.e., union with God. The problem is that this 
association is so rudimentary that we might think charity will end up being 
little more than an insipid kindly attitude. If I am devoted to attaining union 
with God, and I notice that you have the capacity to attain that union, I may 
have reason to consult with you in "friendly" ways, but it seems that my 
concern with you will be merely instrumental to my attainment of union with 
God. So my first question for charity as a type of human relationship is 
whether it can be something more than an insipid, and perhaps purely instru-
mental, kindly attitude. 
The second issue I want to focus on has to do with the causes of charity. 
Aquinas follows Aristotle in recognizing four types of causes, and he thinks 
that charity has each of the four. I want to see in what way one's neighbor 
can be a cause of charity. If I love you, then you or something about you 
must in some way be a cause of that love. Otherwise it is not clear how it 
could be true to say that it is you that I love, or at the very least my love for 
you might be insulting to you. If your character, abilities, personality or even 
appearance do not factor in as causes of my love for you, then I may be 
treating as irrelevant or worthless everything that matters most to you about 
your own life. So my second question for charity as a type of human rela-
tionship is whether (and if so, in what way) one's neighbor can count as a 
cause of charity. 
The third issue I want to focus on follows from the fact that as a type of 
friendship, charity must involve a love for the other for her own sake and not 
merely instrumentally. To use the classic example again, I might love wine, 
but not for its own sake, only as a means to my own pleasure. Aquinas marks 
this distinction by separating genuine friendship (amicitia or amor amicitiae) 
from concupiscence (concupiscentia or amor concupiscentiae).6 He quotes 
Aristotle as saying that "someone is said to love wine for its sweetness 
(propter dulce) which he desires (concupiscit)." So we have mere concupis-
cence for the wine instead of genuine friendship on the grounds that we love 
the wine propter dulce and not propter vinum.7 But Aquinas also explicitly 
states that with charity we are to love our neighbor propter Deum. He says 
that "it would be reprehensible if someone loved his neighbor (proximum) as 
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his principle end, but not if he loved his neighbor propter Deum, which 
pertains to charity."8 If it also turns out that loving a neighbor propter Deum 
entails that you do not love the neighbor propter proximum ("for the neigh-
bor's own sake," or propter seipsam, "for his own sake"), then it would seem 
that charity for a neighbor is really a form of concupiscence and not a genuine 
form of friendship. The embarrassing conclusion would then have to be that 
when they acquire charity, Christians cease to have genuine friendship for other 
human beings. So my third question for charity as a type of human relationship 
is whether charity can involve genuine friendship between human beings. 
Together, the answers to these three questions will help to clarify the con-
cept of charity (caritas). I take up these three issues in the order in which I 
have just mentioned them. 
Section 2: Association 
According to Aquinas, every friendship is based on association. 
[E]ach friendship principally regards that in which principally is found that 
good upon which the association is founded, as political friendship princi-
pally regards the ruler of the city upon whom the whole good of the city 
depends.9 
Aquinas recognizes many different types of associations, but it will be con-
venient to divide them into two groups: "co-operative associations" and "co-
relative associations."10 What I will call "co-operative associations" are 
introduced thus: 
The different types of friendship are distinguished-according to the differ-
ent associations upon which they are founded, e.g. kinsmen have one type of 
friendship, and fellow citizens or fellow travellers have a different type. l1 
What all these types of association seem to have in common is that they 
involve some sort of co-operation in the pursuit of one and the same goal. 
Fellow citizens co-operate for a good society, kinsmen co-operate for a good 
family, fellow travellers co-operate for a good journey to the common desti-
nation {and fellow soldiers co-operate for victory),12 
Of course there can be more and less intimate types of co-operation. On 
the one extreme, fellow bus-riders have a kind of "association of fellow 
travellers" and so there are spoken and unspoken rules of conduct for bus 
riders so as to facilitate a good journey for as long as the association lasts. 
Perhaps on the other extreme is the "association of grace" {communicatio 
gratiae).J3 Concerning this association, Aquinas quotes Ambrose as saying 
the following: 14 
No less do I love you, whom I have begotten in the Gospel, than if I had 
begotten you in marriage. For nature is not more vehement for love than 
grace. Surely we ought to love more those with whom we expect to be forever 
than those with whom we expect to be only in this world. 
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Aquinas responds as follows: 
Ambrose is speaking of love with respect to the benefits which pertain to the 
association of grace (communicatio gratiae), namely moral instruction. For 
in this someone ought to help spiritual children, whom he has begotten 
spiritually, more than biological (cor poralibus) children, whom he is more 
bound to support bodily. 
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This is an instance of Aquinas' general answer to the question of article 8: 
whether blood relatives are to be loved most of all. His general answer to 
this question is that degrees of love need to be relativised to the associations 
upon which the friendships are based. 
The intensity of love is from the union of lover and beloved. For this reason 
the love of different people is to be measured according to the different types 
of union, so that one person is loved more in that which pertains to the union 
according to which he is loved. 
So he goes on to say that when it comes to matters of "nature," blood relatives 
are to be loved more. But when it comes to political matters, fellow citizens 
are to be loved more, and when it comes to war, fellow soldiers are to be 
loved more. 
This is enough to give us a preliminary answer to my first question about 
charity. Charity can indeed be much more than in insipid, kindly attitude. In 
fact, it can be as intense and intimate as any secular friendship, because it 
can be based on associations as important and as intimate as any secular 
association. In fact, as may very well be the case with the "association of 
grace," a particular instance of charity might be even more intense and inti-
mate than any other relationship, since it may involve an intimacy in spiritual 
matters in addition to an intimacy with respect to the affairs of this world. 
Of course not everyone will be loved from charity with exactly the same 
intensity and intimacy, but that is as it should be. The love of one human for 
another, even if it is in some way "supernatural love," should still to some 
degree reflect the variety of human relationships. 
But charity need not be based on something as intimate as what I have been 
calling "co-operative associations." There is only one association necessary 
for charity: the "association of everlasting happiness" (communicatio beati-
tudinis aeternae).ls This entails that we cannot have charity for any non-ra-
tional being, since only rational beings are capable of attaining "everlasting 
happiness" (i.e., "beatitude").16 Aquinas says that 
according tot hat by w which something has association (societatem) in 
rational nature with us, so it is lovable from charity. Therefore rational nature 
is the object of charity.'7 
Aquinas uses this fact in his argument that charity does not stop at God but 
extends to our neighbor as well. 
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The aspect under which our neighbor is to be loved is God, for this is what 
we ought to love in our neighbor: that he be in God. From which it is clear 
that it is one and the same species of act by which we love God and by which 
we love our neighbor. 
Of course this will serve to extend charity well beyond our "neighbor" in the 
parochial sense. With charity we are to love every rational being, including 
the angels, because we share the "association of everlasting happiness" with 
them.ls Aquinas even gives us the primary content of this love: we are to love 
each rational being "that he be in God." For two reasons this may give the 
impression that charity is an insipid, kindly attitude. 
First, mere rationality is not a robust foundation for love. How deep can 
my love for you be if the only thing I know about you is that you have a rational 
nature and so are capable of attaining beatitude? Second, "that he be in God" 
seems to be a rather narrow focus for love. It seems to be caring about only one 
limited aspect of someone's life. Two things should be said in response. 
First, there is a significant benefit which derives from the fact that loving 
someone with charity depends only upon her having a rational nature: this 
makes charity "unconditional." While it is good that some forms of human 
love must in some sense be "earned," it is also good that some form of love 
need not be earned, that one need not pass any test or satisfy any special 
conditions to be a recipient of it. 19 Because the requirements for being an 
object of charity are so minimal, charity insures that no human being will go 
entirely unloved, and that in itself makes charity worthwhile. 
Second, loving someone "that he be in God" is neither insipid nor "merely 
kindly" because it involves a deep concern for the beloved. Consider Christy 
the christian who has charity for Betty the hardened criminal. Christy and 
Betty have very few interests in common and the directions of their lives are 
very different. How is it possible for Christy to love Betty? First, Christ will 
consider that she would not be doing Betty any favors by showing sympathy 
for Betty'S lawless interests. Those interests are dangerous for many, and 
encourage Betty in a life which is not a good one; in fact, it is a life which 
is not good even for Betty. In other words, Christy will distinguish Betty'S 
true good from her merely apparent good, and will wish for (and perhaps do 
things to help Betty achieve) the former and not the latter. Here we can 
distinguish the following two attitudes.20 
Simple Altruism: The fact that P desires x is by itself a reason for giving P x. 
Metaphysical Altruism: The fact that P desires x is not by itself a reason for 
giving P x; we have reason to give P x only if doing so promotes P's true 
welfare. 
Simple altruism can be little more than the "I wish you few irritations" 
attitude toward someone. When it gives rise to actions it can be dangerous 
because sometimes our own desires can be ill considered. Sometimes the 
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satisfaction of one of our desires precludes the satisfaction of another more 
important desire. Metaphysical altruism considers not merely the gratification 
of the other, but the overall, long-term welfare of the other. Of course there 
are problems with this type of altruism, since there are many possible alter-
native metaphysics of human welfare, but this type of altruism is sensitive to 
the fact that human welfare is much more complex than the mere gratification 
of desire. So even in cases where charity does not involve a very rich or 
intimate association between two people, and even when it gives rise to no direct 
involvement in the other's life, since it involves metaphysical and not merely 
simple altruism, it is incorrect to call it an "insipid" or "merely kindly" attitude. 
Section 3: The Causes of Charity 
Aquinas takes over Aristotle's theory that there are four kinds of causes: 
material, efficient, final and formaPl In which ways, if any, is one's neighbor 
a cause of charity? 
3.1 The Material Cause 
The material cause of the burning of the table is the table's intrinsic disposi-
tion to burn, but this is simply the wood of which the table is made. The 
material cause of charity is what is responsible for one's disposition to love 
with charity, that is, what first inclines one's affections to the beloved. Since 
charity is the friendship of man for God, the material cause must explain our 
first inclination to love God, what it is which first drew us to God. Aquinas 
mentions three such causes: benefits God bestows on us (an example may be 
a favorable answer to a prayer), rewards we hope to receive from God in the 
future (presumably this includes heaven), and punishment we hope to avoid 
(presumably this includes hell)Y 
We can deal with this briefly because Aquinas is quite clear that the material 
cause is the explanation only of what first inclined us to love God (and 
thereafter our neighbors). This tells us nothing about the character of the love 
after it has begun. He mentions that after we begin to love a friend, we no 
longer love her because of the benefits she confers on us, but because of her 
virtue. Perhaps I began loving my parents because of the gifts they gave me, 
but now that my love for them is more mature, the character of my love for 
them is quite different. Perhaps I began loving you only because of the 
rewards I hoped to receive from God by doing so, but once my love has a 
chance to mature, the character of my love for you may be quite different. 
3.2 The Efficient Cause 
Aquinas does not explain what he means by the efficient cause of charity; he 
simply gives us an example. He says that "with respect to the efficient cause, 
we love some people in as much as they are children of such and such a 
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father."23 The one to whom others must be related in order to be lovable by 
charity is God; so God is the efficient cause of charity. There are three things 
he might mean by this. He might mean that (a) you love the son because the 
father wants you to, or that (b) you love the son because he reminds you of 
the father, or that (c) knowing and loving the father is (at least partially) 
responsible for your coming to see certain lovable features in the son. 
If Aquinas intends (a) or (b), then it might appear that with charity, one 
does not really love another human being for her own sake. It is no comfort 
to be told by someone who supposedly loves you that she loves you only 
because some third person wants her to love you. This might appear to imply 
that you don't really deserve to be loved. But if Aquinas intends interpretation 
(c), there is no problem. If I loved your father because of his lovable qualities, 
and then I see that you have those qualities also, I may love you because of 
your resemblance to your father, but that would not be incompatible with 
loving you for your own sake.24 
3.3 The Final Cause 
The final cause or "ultimate end," the point or goal, of charity is God.2s There 
are, however, two ways Aquinas speaks of an ultimate end.26 On the one hand, 
the ultimate end of a human being is the object the attainment of which 
completely fulfills the specifying capacities of a human. Of course according 
to Aquinas this object is God. But the ultimate end can be (and, according to 
Aquinas, more properly is) said to be the attainment of that object. In this 
sense, the ultimate end of a person is a state of that person. So while in the 
first sense the "ultimate end" of charity is God, in the second sense the 
"ultimate end" of charity is union with God (i.e., having the "beatific vision"). 
But if the ultimate end of charity is union with God, can one, with charity, 
love someone other than God for her own (i.e., the other's) sake and not only 
as an instrumental means to union with God? If God is the ultimate end, can 
a human being be an ultimate end of charity? Perhaps. If we interpret the 
efficient cause of charity in way (c) mentioned above (see section 3.2), then 
it may be possible to love human beings as ultimate ends, even if God is the 
ultimate end of charity. If we love God as our ultimate end because of 
properties PI-Pn, and if human beings can exhibit PI-Pn, then we could 
possibly love those human beings as ultimate ends. If those properties are 
essential to those human beings, then with charity one can love those people 
for who they are essentially, in addition to loving them as ultimate ends. This 
is reinforced by what Aquinas says about the formal cause of charity. 
3.4 The Formal Cause 
The formal cause of charity is, again, God.27 Aquinas tells us that charity 
loves God ratione sui ipsius (roughly, "because of himself') and loves other 
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people ratione Dei (roughly, "because of God").28 He also tells us that friend-
ship for virtue (other than charity) loves humans ratione sui ips ius and not 
ratione Dei. This seems to raise a problem (see table). 
ratione sui ips ius ratione Dei 
Charity for God YES YES 
Charity for a neighbor ? YES 
Aristotelian friendship YES NO 
for a neighbor 
With friendship (other than charity) one loves another human being for what 
he or she is, while with charity one appears to love another human being not 
for what he or she is. Aquinas, however, never says this, because he never 
explicitly tells us whether or not with charity one can love a human ratione 
sui ipsius as well as ratione Dei. We must see exactly what Aquinas means 
when he says that with charity one loves human beings ratione Dei; then we 
will be in a position to see if with charity one can love a human being ratione 
sui ipsius. 
Section 4: Charity for Humans 
What does Aquinas mean when he says that with charity we love others 
ratione Dei? Different texts suggest three different meanings for this: (1) with 
charity one loves another person only in virtue of certain relational properties 
of hers (i.e., her relation to God), (2) charity loves God "through humans," 
and (3) charity loves God "in humans." 
4.1 Loving a Relational Property 
There are four types of texts which may seem to suggest that when one loves 
another with charity, one loves a relational property of the other. 
4.1a: Referuntur 
One example of the first type of text is this: " ... by the same love of charity 
we love all our neighbors insofar as they are traced back [referuntur] to one 
good in common, which is God."29 Texts of this first type may be interpreted 
in three ways. They may be (a) intended as allusions to other texts where he 
more clearly explains the relational-property interpretation,30 or else (b) the 
"to one good in common" part of the text shows that here he is not trying to 
specify the object of charity, but only to point out how the association con-
dition for friendship is satisfied by charity for humans. Finally, it may be (c) 
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an expression of whatever he means by the claim that "we love some people 
in as much as they are children of such and such a father."31 If these texts are 
relevant for showing how charity can take a human being for its object, then 
we must turn to other texts to see just how they are relevant. 
4.1b: Ad Deum Pertinentia 
In the second type of text which appears to support the view that we love 
others only for some of their relational properties, Aquinas says, for example, 
that charity is the 
friendship of a human being to God principally, and consequently to those 
things which are God's ... and so among the other things which one loves out 
of charity as pertaining to God, one also loves oneself out of charity.32 
To put the question somewhat awkwardly, if with charity I love you "as 
pertaining to God," do I love the pertaining, or do I love you? Fortunately 
we don't have to make a choice here (or figure out what precisely it would 
mean to love "the pertaining") since Aquinas reveals what he means when 
he talks about loving someone "as pertaining to God": 
For just as it is good to love a friend insofar as he is a friend, so also it is 
bad to love an enemy because he is an enemy; but it is good to love an enemy 
insofar as he pertains to God ... [T]o love a friend insofar as he is a friend 
and an enemy insofar as he is an enemy would be contrary; but to love a 
friend and an enemy insofar as either is of God is not contrary.33 
I think the proper way to interpret this is to say that Aquinas is using the idea 
of loving someone "as pertaining to God" interchangeably with the idea of 
loving someone for what they have "of God." So we need not worry about 
these texts now, for I will discuss below what Aquinas means by loving 
someone for what they have "of God" (see section 4.3). 
4.1c: Secundum Propinquitatem 
In the third type of text which appears to support the view that when we love 
others with charity we love them only for some of their relational properties, 
Aquinas says, for example: 
Since the principle[s] of love [are] God and the one who loves, it is necessary 
that the affection of love be greater by greater propinquity to one of those 
principles ... [since] in all things in which some principle is found, the order 
of those things is determined by the relationship to that principle.34 
So the "greater propinquity" you have to God or to me, the greater is my 
affection for you if I love you with charity. The question here is, in what does 
this "propinquity" consist? 
All neighbors are not equally related to God, but some are closer to Him (ei 
propinquiores) because of greater goodness. Those people we ought to love from 
charity more than the others who are not so close to Him (ei minus propinqui).3s 
THOMISTIC CHARITY 217 
The better one is, the closer to God one is. I will argue below that this is what 
Aquinas means by loving someone because of what they have "of God" (see 
section 4.3). 
4.1d: Beatitudinis Capaces 
In the fourth, and final, type of text which appears to support the view that 
we love others with charity only for some of their relational properties, 
Aquinas says, for example: 
But since the object of love taken universally is the good taken in common 
it is necessary that for each type of love there be a corresponding good object. 
For example, of natural friendship (i.e. the friendship of blood relatives) the 
proper object is a natural good derived from their parents. In political friend-
ship the object is a good city. Therefore charity has a corresponding good as 
its proper object, namely the good of divine happiness ... therefore in so far 
as some things are related to this good, so also are they related to their being 
lovable from charity.36 
According to Aquinas, what applies to political friendship also applies to 
charity. But it might seem that in political friendship one loves the other only 
for expediency, ordy because the beloved is (currently) useful in achieving one's 
own political aims. In effect, you love the other as a tool, and what you love 
about the other is certain of her relational properties, i.e. the relations she bears 
to one's own political aims. Perhaps this is an unreasonably cynical (and un-
Thomistic) understanding of political friendship, but if that is what Aquinas has 
in mind, then it could show that something very similar happens with charity. 
Fortunately we can avoid this interpretation. Compare the following: 
[IJn sinners two things are to be considered: nature and guilt. According to 
his nature, which he has from God, he has the capacity for happiness (capaces 
sunt beatitudinis), upon which the association of charity is founded, as was 
said above. Therefore according to his nature he is to be loved with charity,37 
With charity we are to love sinners for their capacity for happiness. But that 
does not entail loving them for a relational property of theirs in a way that 
would make charity like the political friendships I described above. The 
capacity for happiness is not a mere relational property, it is the sinner's 
nature. So when I love you for this capacity of yours, it is not like loving 
you only as a means to my own aims. In fact I am loving you for what you 
are. I will clarify this below (see section 4.3), but this makes it clear that 
these texts do not show that with charity we are to love mere relational 
properties of others. Therefore there is no solid textual support for the view 
that with charity we are to love relational properties of others. 
4.2 Loving God through the Beloved 
There are three types of texts which may seem to show that Aquinas intends 
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to say that the only object of charity is God, and that charity relates to humans 
only insofar as it loves God through them. Before we examine them, however, 
we should notice two things which might be meant by loving God "through" 
some human being. 
First, we might love God "through" human beings by loving them not for 
their own sakes but only for the sake of God (if this counts as loving the 
human being at all). One obvious way to understand this is to employ the 
relational-property interpretation we have just gone through. Loving God 
"through" humans might, however, be taken a different way. 
A second way we might love God "through" human beings is by loving 
them (perhaps as ultimate ends) out of obedience to God's wishes. If I love 
others in this way, however, exactly what is it I love about them? If what I 
love about them is the respects in which they deserve to be loved, then this 
interpretation seems to collapse into the God-in-the-beloved interpretation 
(as I shall argue in section 4.3). On the other hand, if what I love about them 
does not deserve to be loved, at most this love will be perverse, or the 
command to love them will be perverse, or at least this love will be insulting 
to the beloved. We must look at the passages which seem to support the 
God-through-the-beloved interpretation to see if Aquinas intends either of 
these readings. 
4.2a: Ad Deum 
The obvious place to look for support for this interpretation is in texts which 
clearly state that God is the object of charity. In fact, his brief definition of 
charity is that "charity is a kind of friendship of a human being for God."38 
This, however, is inconclusive. God's being the object of charity will be 
compatible with humans being objects of charity if with charity I can love 
God in humans (see section 4.3). 
4.2b: Ad Finem, Propter Finem 
Certain logical grounds would seem to rule out all but God as objects of 
charity. According to Aquinas, those things which are ad finem we wish for 
propter finem. 39 I will refer to this as the ad-finem-entails-propter-finem prin-
ciple. Now if Aquinas claims that with charity we are to love our neighbor 
ad Deum, then, since God is the end (finis) of charity, we must love our 
neighbor ad finem. Putting this together with the ad-finem-entails-propter-fi-
nem principle we can derive the claim that with charity we are to love our 
neighbor propter finem, i.e., propter Deum, apparently just like the doctor 
who gathers herbs "to make a potion to heal someone, by collecting the herbs 
he intends health for the sake of which [propter quam] he makes the potion."40 
But would this show that our neighbor is not a genuine object of charity? Not 
necessarily. 
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Aquinas notes that propter can denote "not only the material cause, but in 
a certain way the formal."41 If it denotes the material cause, then the object 
loved is God and not humans; but if it denotes the formal cause, and if humans 
have some of God's formal properties, then the logical grounds may indeed 
commit us to the conclusion that humans are loved propter jinem, but this 
will not be sufficient to show that they are not loved for their own sakes. If 
the formal property I have of God is my rationality, and another person loves 
this feature of me, then the other can love me propter jinem but also for my 
own sake, because this property constitutes my essence (or at least what is 
most important about my essence). Hence, loving someone propter jinem 
need not be incompatible with loving her for her own sake, propter seipsam. 
4.2c: Heavenly Charity 
The third group of texts which may seem to commit Aquinas to the claim that 
we are to love God through the beloved regard the lover's attitude to the 
beloved. Every person's aim is union with and enjoyment of God.42 But on 
earth other human beings are the best reflections of God suited to our limited 
faculties, so with charity one loves them as poor second bests.43 If I have no 
hope of attaining what I really want, then this may not have unfortunate 
results for love: given my sorry condition, the very best thing for me is to 
love other human beings as fully as possible. But if I do have a hope of 
attaining what I really want, and not just attaining things that are somewhat 
like what I really want, then there might be reason to treat humans as poor 
second bests in a way which might seem objectionable. If what I really crave 
is dark chocolate, then I might settle for cheap milk chocolate if that is all I 
can get right now in the way of chocolate, but I'll cast it aside in a second if 
I have a real chance of getting dark chocolate. However, this cannot be what 
Aquinas has in mind. 
If Aquinas thought that we loved humans only because they are somewhat 
like what we really want, then he would have to think that once we get what 
we really want, we forget about humans, just as when I finally get dark 
chocolate I would thrown the milk chocolate away. This is not, however, the 
way Aquinas thinks we love humans. Aquinas argues that even in heaven, 
when we finally attain what we really want, we still love other humans.44 
On the contrary, Aquinas says of the soul in heaven that the "heavenly 
charity fulfills the entire potentiality of the rational mind, insofar as every 
actual motion of it is drawn to [fertur] to God."4s This might sound as if in 
heaven one is occupied with God to the exclusion a/human beings. However, 
if what one loves is God "in the beloved," and what the other has "of God" 
is essential to that person, then one's mind can be referred to God directly 
by loving a human being per se. So I now tum to what it means to love God 
"in the beloved." 
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4.3. Loving God in the Beloved 
Aquinas does explicitly say that with charity God can be loved in humans. 
For example, he says that charity loves God "in omnibus proximis" and "in 
omnibus aliis."46 He clarifies this a bit by mentioning the "similitude" be-
tween humans and God,47 that humans are "one with God"48 and that humans 
having something "of God."49 But he is clearest when he discusses our "par-
ticipation in God." Two passages in particular from ST IIaIIae q.26 a.2 are 
important for understanding what it is to have something "of God," to be 
"like God" and to be "one with God." 
ad 2: .,. the similitude which we have to God is prior to and a cause of the 
similitude which we have to our neighbor; for from the fact that we have by 
participation in God that which our neighbor also has from Him, we are made 
similar to our neighbor. And because of similitude we ought to love God more 
than our neighbor. 
ad 3: ... God, considered according to his substance, is equally in whatever 
he may be in because he is not diminished by the fact that he is in something. 
But nevertheless a neighbor does not have the goodness of God just as God 
has it: for God has it essentially; the neighbor only by participation. 
Why is one's similitude to God prior to and a cause of one's similitude to 
one's neighbor? The answer in ad 2 above is that the property in respect of 
which one is similar to one's neighbor is the property of having some par-
ticular similitude to God. So it seems that specifying one's similitude to one's 
neighbor requires specifying one's similitude to God, but not vice versa.so 
On the other hand, the feature in virtue of which one has some similitude 
to God is some positive feature of oneself which is specifiable without ref-
erence to God. One is similar to God in virtue of having certain potentialities 
for certain activities, e.g., knowing and willing. These, however can be speci-
fied by a description of what knowledge and willing in general are, and how 
any mind carries out those operations. But it is just these features which are 
the respects in which one is similar to one's neighbor. So this similitude, it 
seems, can be specified without first specifying each one's similitude to God. 
Certainly this similitude could not hold unless God had first given them 
the properties in virtue of which they are similar, but the similarity itself 
seems to rest simply on their having positive features which are different 
tokens of a single type of potentiality which seems capable of being specified 
without mention of God. Aquinas seems to be relying on a certain view about 
the be st way to specify potentialities. He says that, 
Since the species of an act is taken from [its] object according to its formal 
ratio, it is necessary that an act be the same in species which is drawn to the 
ratio of the object, and which is drawn to the object under that ratio ... the 
ratio of loving a neighbor is God, for we ought to love this in our neighbor, 
that he may be in GOd.51 
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The relevant potentiality, which is simply our rational nature,52 is specified by 
its potentiality to attain God. That is what would constitute its complete actuali-
zation: being a godly person. What is of primary value for the individual is not 
promoting some overall state of affairs, nor is it obeying certain objective duties, 
but it is being a certain sort of person, i.e., a person who is as God-like as possible. 
The capacity is specified by the sort of person which would result if the 
capacity were fully actualized, that is why our goodness must be specified 
by reference to God.53 This is also why charity loves a person ratione Dei, 
since "the neighbor is loved only because of God, and so, speaking formally, 
both are one object of love although materially they are twO."54 It does not 
confuse God with people other than oneself, but the reason it has for taking 
God as its object is the same reason it has to make other people its objects, 
since they are all one object, formally speaking. Finally, because the formal 
properties in virtue of which we are "one object" with God are essential to 
us (we are essentially rational creatures), charity can love a human ratione 
Dei and also ratione sui ipsius. 
Section 5: Conclusion 
So we have just answered the question left at the end of section 3. God is the 
formal cause of charity, and understood correctly, with a proper view of the 
human essence, this entails that a human can also be a formal cause of charity, 
and so with charity I can love you ratione Dei and also ratione sui ipsius. I can 
love you "because of God" and also "because of yourself'; I can love God as 
the ultimate end and I can love you as an ultimate end. Your essential (rational) 
nature is something divine. With charity I see in you something divine, and so 
I love it because of itself; but that divine part of you is nothing other than your 
essential (rational) nature, and so I love you because of yourself. 
So in the end I think that my friend's position on "loving Jesus with her 
whole heart" was correct: she was never given an adequate explanation of 
how "loving Jesus with her whole heart" could be compatible with genuinely 
loving her mother. The answer she should have been given is that "loving 
Jesus with her whole heart" will cause her to see even more clearly just how 
God-like, and hence just how lovable her mother truly is, and that should 
strengthen and not undermine that love. Aquinas does succeed in showing 
how with charity we can love God and our neighbor. 
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NOTES 
1. [Claritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum. Summa Theoiogiae, hereafter ST, 
IIaIIae q.23 a.1. 
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2. [Caritasj se extendit ad peccatores, quos excaritate diligimus propter Deum. ST 
IIaIIae q.23 a.l ad 3. 
3. [Ijn dilectione proximi includitur dilectio Dei sicutfinis in eo quod est adfinem, et 
e converso, ST IIaIIae q.44 a.2 ad 4. 
4. ST IaIIae q.26 a.4 sed contra. 
5. An anonymous referee for Faith and Philosophy pointed out to me that complete 
devotion to God is compatible with genuine friendship for our fellow human beings 
because loving God "above all else" is compatible with loving your neighbor "as your-
self." This is correct, but what I am interested in might be put by saying that I wonder 
how it is even possible for us to love ourselves with charity. If charity is defined as 
"friendship of a person for God," then "charity for oneself' or "charity for your neighbor 
as yourself' seem to be impossible by definition. 
6. ST Iallae q.26 a.4 sed contra. 
7. Aquinas doesn't make the point quite this explicit, but it does clearly seem to be the 
intent of the passage, and it is explicit in the Aristotelian text which Aquinas is quoting. 
See Topics ii.3, 111al-8. 
8. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.l ad 3. 
9. STIIaIIae q.26 a.2 c. See also a.l and Quaestiones Disputatae De Caritate, hereafter 
DC, a.7 ad 12. 
10. These are my terms, not Aquinas'. 
11. ST IIaIIae q.23 a.5 c. See also q.26 a.3 c and a.8 c where he adds the association of 
fellow soldiers. 
12. See ST lIaIIae q.26 a.8 c and DC a.7 c. 
13. See ST q.26 a.8. 
14. Ibid., objection 2. 
15. ST IIaIIae q.23 a.5 c. See also DC a.7 sed contra and ad 9; ST IIaIIae q.25 a.3 c; 
q.23 a.l c and ad 1; q.24 a.2 c; q.25 a.2 ad 2, a.6 c, a.11 ad I, a.12 c and ad 3. 
16. STIIaIIae q.25 a.3 c. On the necessity of rationality for beatitude see STIaIIae q.3. 
17. DC a.7 sed contra. 
18. On loving the angels see DC a.7 ob. 9 and ad 9. 
19. To be absolutely precise, there is one condition on being an object of charity: you 
must have a rational nature. The point of nevertheless calling this love "unconditional" is 
to say that every naturally rational being is lovable for what she is, regardless of what she 
does or how she conducts herself. 
20. See Terence Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1988), pp. 389ff, pp. 613-14 n.4. 
21. I do not intend to give an account of Aquinas' or Aristotle's theory ofthe four causes. 
I simply want to take what Aquinas says about them and see if they entail that human 
beings are not loved per se with charity. 
22. ST IIaIIae q.27 a.3 c. 
23. ST IIaIIae q.27 a.3 c, cf. Summa Contra Gentiles iv, 21, 1. 
24. Alternatively, Aquinas could hold that the efficient cause, like the material cause, 
tells us only how the love is initiated, not why it is maintained. 
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25. DC q.8 ad 16. 
26. ST Iallae q.3 a.l c. 
27. DC a.5 ad 2 and a.4 ad 1. 
28. DC a.4 c. 
29. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.l ad 2 (cf. q.26 a.l ad 2). 
30. See sections 4.lb, 4.lc and 4.ld below. 
31. See section 3.2 above and 4.lb below. 
32. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.4 c. It should be noted that in this context, Aquinas seems to use 
"pertineo" and "attineo" interchangeably, cf. q.23 a.1 ad 3, q.25 a.8 c, and DC a.4 c, a.8 
c. 
33. DC a.8 ad 11 and ad 12, emphasis added. 
34. ST IIaIIae q.26 a.6 c, cf. q.26 a.13 c and DC a.9 ad 12. 
35. ST IIaIIae q.26 a.6 ad 2. 
36. DC a.7 c. See also ST IIaIIae q.25 a.6 c, cf. DC a.2 c, a.4 ad 2, ad 11. 
37. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.6 c. See also ST IIaIIae q.23 a.l c, q.24 a.2 c, q.25 a.6 c, a.1O c, 
a.12 c, a.12 ad 3, q.26 a.2 c, a.5 c. 
38. ST IIaIIae q.23 a.l c; see also q.23 a.5 ad 1, a.6 c, q.24 a.2 c, a.8 c, q.26 a.7 c; DC 
a.2ob 16 and ad 16, a.2 ad 13, a.3 ad 17, a.8 c. 
39. DC a.l c, see also DC a.11 ad 2. 
40. DC a.l1 ad 2. 
41. DC a.5 ad 2. 
42. ST IIaIIae q.23 a.6 c, q.24 a.9 c, ad 3, q.26 a.13 ad 1, DC a.9 c. 
43. ST IIaIIae q.26 a.2 ad I, q.27 a.4 c, and DC a.4 ad 3, a.9 ad 6. 
44. STIIaIIae q.26 a.13. 
45. ST IIaIIae q .24 a.11 c, cf. DC a.12 c, a.1O ad 5. 
46. DC a.4 c, cf. a.9 ad 4. 
47. DC a.l ad 8. 
48. DC a.9 ad 5. 
49. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.l ad I, cf. DC a.8 ad 8 and a.8 ad 12. 
50. Part of the point in ad 2 above is that the basis of my love for my neighbor are those 
respects in which we are similar. The fact that the basis of our friendship, i.e., our 
similarity, consists in the respects in which we are both similar to God makes our 
friendship amor caritatis and not merely amor amicitiae. 
51. ST IIaIIae q.25 a.l c. 
52. ST lIaIlae q.25 a.3 c and DC a.7 sed contra and ad 9. 
53. STIIaIIae q.23 a.2 ad 1, q.26 a.4 c, q.27 a.l ad 2, DC a.4 ad 4, a.7 ad 3. 
54. DC a.4 ad I, a.5 ad 2, a.7 c. 
